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Chapter 10 
The Politics of Need
Andrew Schaap
…in labour and consumption man is utterly thrown back on himself…on the 
biological, and on himself. And there you have the connection with loneliness. 
A peculiar loneliness arises in the process of labor. I cannot go into that right 
now, because it would lead us too far afield. But this loneliness consists in being 
thrown back upon oneself; a state of affairs in which, so to speak, consumption 
takes the place of all the truly relating activities. (EU, 21)
In this chapter I examine why Hannah Arendt views the satisfaction of human 
needs as, at best a pre-political concern and, at worst, the basis of an anti-political 
politics. This requires unpacking how Arendt develops her concept of the political in 
terms of her critique of Marx’s valorization of labor. I argue that Arendt’s rejection 
of the satisfaction of human needs as a properly political concern is premised 
on a reductive ontological conception of needs, whi h neglects their historical 
dimension. I agree with Arendt that the end of politics is the enjoyment of freedom 
in a community of equals. Against Arendt, however, I take it that politics often 
begins with the articulation of injustice, arising from the experience of unmet 
need. From this perspective, Arendt’s conception of the political has the perverse 
consequence of potentially depoliticizing injustice. Yet Arendt’s understanding of 
the political in terms of praxis might nonetheless enable a distinction to be drawn 
between an authentic (political) form of the politics of need and an inauthentic 
(anti- or a-political) politics. In this context, both Marx’s concept of ‘radical need’ 
(as discussed by Agnes Heller) and the work of Jacques Rancière suggest the 
possibility of a politics of need that might have the world-disclosing potential that 
is, for Arendt, the defining feature of the political.
The Anti-political Politics of Need
In The Human Condition, Arendt provides a phenomenology of action through 
which she attempts to understand politics on its own terms (as praxis) rather than 
from the perspective of transcendent reason. As such, she delineates a ‘specific 
political mode of rationality’ in terms of the concept of the political (Vollrath 1987, 
18). The concept of the political refers both to the proper domain of politics and 
the specific quality in terms of which we might judge phenomena (events, actions, 
institutions, etc.) to be political or not. It is in this sense that Arendt attempts 
to ‘look at politics…with eyes unclouded by philosophy’, as she puts it in her 
interview with Gaus (EU, 2).
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Power, Judgment and Political Evil158
Ernst Vollrath (1987) argues that the rationality of the political should be 
understood in terms of its autonomy and authenticity. By authenticity he means 
that the quality that distinguishes the political from the non-political is irreducible 
to an evaluative criterion drawn from some other human activity. According to 
Arendt, for example, the political aspect of an event depends on its testament to 
human freedom rather than whether it conforms to the moral standard of rightness. 
The closely related notion of the autonomy of the political means that the principles 
according to which the domain of the political is properly constituted are not 
derived from or subordinate to any other field or domain. In contrast to orthodox 
Marxism, for example, politics cannot be adequately apprehended in terms of 
economic categories.
The concept of the political therefore has an evaluative aspect since it enables 
us to describe things as more or less political. Indeed, as Vollrath (1987, 20) 
points out, ‘we may, in this respect, speak of a-political politics or of non-political 
politics’. Neo-liberalism, for instance, may be understood to be intensely political 
as a project that aims to transform society according to certain core ideological 
values. Yet it may be described as an anti-political politics due to its disavowal 
of its own political nature. Its theory of limited government, which subordinates 
politics to the protection of economic freedom leads to an inauthentic politics. 
Moreover, its ambition to remake the social world in terms of the image of a 
perfect market denies the autonomy of the political.
According to Stephen White (2001, 174-5), the concept of the political 
describes a process of ‘forging commonality from particularity’ and ‘isolates a 
kind of a kind of universality that is distinctive to politics’. For Hannah Arendt, the 
political describes a potential for the disclosure of a social world from the plural 
perspectives of individuals who come together to act in concert. This conception 
of the political can be delineated in terms of five aspects. First, the political is 
initiatory since it does not refer to an institutional domain but the event of world 
disclosure. As Sheldon Wolin (1996, 31) puts it, the political is ‘episodic, rare’. 
Second, the political is constitutive since it refers not to instituted politics as enacted 
against a set of already established expectations. Rather, the political is prior to 
the establishment of institutions. It refers to the context in terms of which politics 
is represented or the ‘scene’ in terms of which politics is ‘staged’ to use Claude 
Lefort’s (1988, 11) terms. Third, the political is inclusive since it does not refer to 
the intensification of being for/against others as in Schmitt (1996, 29) but rather 
presupposes a context of being with a plurality of equals. Fourth, the political 
is performative since politics is not understood in terms of an identification that 
makes collective action possible. Rather a unity emerges through a plurality acting 
in concert. Finally, the political is disclosive since it is not reducible to a moment 
of decision nor can it be circumscribed in terms of the reasonable. Rather, it is an 
‘associative moment’ of praxis (Vollrath 1987, 27).
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The Politics of Need 159
Arendt’s conception of the political provides an important basis for understanding 
the context in which politics is enacted.1 However, it is precisely this conception 
of the political that Arendt invokes to criticize need as a non-political concern (see 
Hansen 1993, 42f.). In her interview with Gaus, Arendt remarks that ‘in labor and 
consumption man is utterly thrown back on himself’ (EU, 21). Prompted by Gaus, 
Arendt explains that this being thrown back on oneself means being subordinated 
to necessity and trapped in one’s own subjectivity (cf HC, 115). Consequently, she 
says ‘a peculiar loneliness arises in the process of labor’ in which ‘consumption 
takes the place of all the truly relating activities’ (EU, 21 – emphasis added). 
Drawing on the Greek experience of the polis, Arendt distinguishes between 
politics/economics and public/private in terms of ‘activities related to a common 
world and those related to the maintenance of life’ (HC, 28). Arendt recognizes 
labor to be an unavoidable aspect of the human condition. In laboring, human 
beings sustain life itself by satisfying the needs of the body and maintain the world 
created through work against the natural processes of decay. However, because 
labor ‘obeys the orders of immediate bodily needs’ (HC, 100), it cannot provide a 
basis for the kind of world-building activity that she values in work and action.
Fundamentally, Arendt’s argument against the politics of need rests on a strong 
ontological claim that the needs of the body are radically isolating and so cannot 
provide any basis for an activity through which the world comes to be shared 
in common. While politics properly concerns freedom and association, needs 
are bound up with necessity and isolation. Consequently, any form of collective 
organization or social movement predicated on the satisfaction of human needs 
would be pre-political at best and at worst, anti-political. It would be pre-political 
insofar as politics, in Arendt’s sense, is only possible to the extent that the needs 
of the body have already been satisfied. In order to actualize our freedom through 
public action, we first need to be liberated from nature by satisfying our biological 
needs for food, shelter and so on. Arendt insists that the realm of freedom begins 
only where ‘the rule of immediate physical needs’ ends (HC, 104).
A politics of need becomes anti-political when public life is overwhelmed by 
economic concerns. Arendt describes this anti-political politics in terms of the 
rise of the social: the organization of politics around the non-political activities of 
production and consumption, which amounts to ‘collective housekeeping’ (Mydral 
cited in HC, 28). Need cannot provide an organizing principle for an authentic 
politics because it is the opposite of freedom. For ‘where life is at stake all action 
is by definition under the sway of necessity’ (BPF, 155). As such, human activity 
related to the satisfaction of need remains bound to nature, which Arendt associates 
1 Liberalism simply presupposes this context and the fact of commonality by casting 
this in terms of individuals’ shared interest in protecting private freedom. Marxism, in 
contrast, anticipates the classless society, in terms of which the liberal representation of 
market society appears as an alienated mode of human togetherness. Arendt points to the 
inadequacy of both of these conceptions by showing the political to be a fragile achievement 
of praxis rather than a context that can be institutionally determined.
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Power, Judgment and Political Evil160
with darkness, privation, anonymity, muteness, identity. In contrast, work and 
political action redeem human existence from the futility of mere life through 
the constitution of the human artifice of material objects and the inter-subjective 
world that she associates with light, publicity, distinction, speech, plurality. In 
politics ‘not life but the world is at stake’ (HC, 156). To the extent that politics is 
concerned with the satisfaction of needs, then, ‘there can be no true public realm, 
but only private activities displayed in the open’ (HC, 134).
Indeed, Arendt attributes the terror of the French Revolution to its preoccupation 
with the ‘social question’, namely, of how to satisfy the needs of the poor/people. 
Here, as elsewhere, she observes that the problem of satisfying needs is properly a 
‘matter of administration, to be put in the hands of experts’ rather than an issue that 
could be settled politically through the exchange of opinions (OR, 91). The need 
of the poor was ‘violent and, as it were, pre-political’ (OR, 91). Consequently, 
the attempt to satisfy their needs by political means, to liberate the poor from 
necessity, gave rise to the anti-political politics of the Jacobins. As Hannah Pitkin 
(1981, 334) observes, Arendt’s argument rests here again on t e ontological claim 
that poverty is a ‘dehumanizing force’, which subordinates individuals to the 
‘absolute dictate of their bodies’ (OR, 60). When ‘the poor, driven by the needs of 
their bodies, burst on to the scene of the French Revolution politics was organized 
around the ‘anti-political imagery of biological necessity’ (OR, 60). For Arendt, 
as Phillip Hansen (1993, 45) puts it, need ‘contains a “blind” drive for fulfilment 
which, because it contains an element of lack and dread, excludes or repels. Pain 
and desire have their reasons but are not themselves reason’.
In short, a politics of need is anti-political because it cannot bring about the 
associative moment of world disclosure that is the defining quality of the political. 
Arendt’s argument about the anti-political politics of need can be reiterated in 
terms of the five aspects of her conception of the political identified above. Rather 
than initiating an event, it construes politics in terms of the collective life process. 
Rather than constituting a world, it construes society in the image of nature. Rather 
than presupposing a context of plurality it presupposes a context of identical 
biological needs. Rather than being concerned with the contingent founding of 
a polity, it represents the collectivity in the image of a social body. Rather than 
being predicated on enjoyment of praxis, politics becomes a means toward the 
satisfaction of collective needs. The ‘politics’ of need therefore amounts to a 
‘perverted form of “acting together”’ (HC, 203).
The Marxist Conception of Need
Critics of Arendt have shown the inadequacy of understanding needs as a pre-
political concern. Nancy Fraser (1989) points out that far from being self-evident 
natural phenomena that can be adequately dealt with by experts, public recognition 
of needs depends on their political articulation. Indeed, politics typically involves 
articulating a need that previously could not be recognized within the prevailing 
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The Politics of Need 161
terms of discourse and in this process new subjectivities are often formed. Hannah 
Pitkin (1981) similarly argues that politics typically involves relating private needs 
to public freedom by recourse to the principle of justice. By engaging in politics, 
what was previously experienced as private suffering may come to be understood 
as an actionable public issue and therefore a matter of justice. Importantly, neither 
Fraser nor Pitkin relinquish Arendt’s insight that what is specific to politics is 
praxis. For instance, Nancy Fraser (1989, 303) suggests that struggles for public 
recognition of unmet needs are political to the extent that they become a ‘moment 
in the self-constitution of new collective agents or social movements’. Needs per 
se are neither inherently political nor un-political but the potential object of politics 
and, therefore, politicizable. 
The problem with Arendt’s argument about the anti-political politics of need is 
that it is grounded in a reified ontological (and hence ‘meta-political’) distinction 
between the necessity of life and freedom of the polis. But, as C.B. Macpherson 
(1977) argues, needs always have both an ontological and an historical aspect. 
Any theory about human needs must presuppose some conception of human 
nature or the human condition. However, if part of what it is to be human means 
being able to determine the conditions of our own existence, then human needs 
will also be historically specific. This gives rise to a contradiction between 
Arendt’s dogmatic ontological distinction and her characterization of human 
nature as opening up to man ‘the possibility of becoming something highly 
unnatural, that is, a man’ (OT, 455). 
In viewing needs as ‘antithetical to our essence as free beings’, Arendt 
adopts a basically Kantian position according to which ‘motivation by needs and 
inclinations is heteronomy’ (Chitty 1993, 26). Arendt explicitly mobilizes this 
ontological argument to critique Marx for whom needs are, in contrast, ‘shaped 
and transformed through our appropriation of external nature’ (Hansen 1993, 41). 
This leads her to develop an uncharitable reading of Marx as valorizing animal 
laborans when, in fact, Arendt’s characterization of labor is much closer to what 
Marx saw as alienated labor. 
According to Arendt, Marx inverted the traditional hierarchy of activities, 
promoting labor to the highest value while denigrating politics as only a means 
to bring about the classless society. Marx’s valorization of labor gives rise to 
an anti-political politics, according to which the central concern of public life 
is the life process itself. Consequently, necessity is substituted for freedom and 
politics is organized according to the values of economics. Ironically, Arendt thus 
tends to read Marx as an economic determinist while neglecting his concern to 
promote the very possibilities for free action with which she is concerned. As 
Bikhu Parekh (1979) points out, where Arendt sees three ontologically distinct 
human activities, Marx invests labor with significance and dignity in according 
it many of the characteristics associated with work and praxis. For Marx, labor 
‘raises man above the realm of necessity and is a vehicle of human freedom and 
creativity’ and so also has the disclosive quality of the political (Parekh 1979, 86). 
Arendt’s over-determined distinction between the realm of necessity and the realm 
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Power, Judgment and Political Evil162
of freedom means that she thinks it inevitable that ‘labor must remain cyclical, 
repetitive, monotonous, and can never become meaningful and fulfilling’ (Parkekh 
1979, 86). 
From a Marxist perspective, the connection Arendt asserts between need, 
necessity and labor is ideological. As Andrew Chitty (1993, 26) explains, for Marx, 
‘the refinement and diversification of needs is the essence of man. Accordingly, 
his freedom consists in this elaboration. It is only social conditions that make us 
experience things otherwise’. The reason we experience our needs as an external 
imposition on us is because under capitalism they become alienated from us. As 
such, it is in class-based society that we experience needs as a compulsion on our 
being. In non-alienated conditions we would experience our needs as part of our 
essential activity since the object of our needs and the means of satisfying them 
would not be separated in terms of the exchange relation.
For Marx the fundamental contradiction of capitalism is that it both expands 
the range of possible needs while thwarting their realization. Positively, needs are 
free to exhibit an unprecedented richness and diversity; negatively, the commodity 
form of need satisfaction and the need for profit fetter their development (Leiss 
1979; Berry 1987; Hansen 1993). Marx insisted that the laborer’s needs for mere 
survival are not simply biological but historical, a product of the alienation of 
his labor power within the capitalist economy: the worker labors not to meet his 
human need for development (which has a non-economic value) but to exchange 
his labor power for money in order to meet his crude need for survival within 
capitalist social relations. 
Contrary to Arendt’s critique of modern consumer society, capitalist societies 
are not organized in order to satisfy human needs but to valorize capital. The 
alienation of needs in capitalist society is expressed in the reduction of genuine 
human needs (as ends in themselves) to economic needs (instrumental to survival). 
As such, ‘need appears only on the market, in the form of effective demand’ (Heller 
1976, 26). Capitalism reduces other humans as a means to the satisfaction of the 
individual’s own alienated needs through the exchange relation. The manipulation 
of needs thus becomes a way of dominating others. In contrast to this alienated 
experience of need, Marx argues that needs are truly human only when other 
humans are their highest object (Heller 1976, 41).
In order to critique the reduction of the needs of workers under capitalism 
to the economic n ed for mere survival, Marx posits the ideal of the individual 
‘rich in needs’ who will be a member of the future society of associated producers 
(Heller 1976, 44). While the development of capitalism enriches the species it 
impoverishes the individual by subordinating him to the social division of labor. 
Overcoming alienation would thus mean providing the individual with a share in 
social wealth. Capitalism reduces all needs to the need ‘to have’. For the dominant 
class, need is directed to accumulation of private property; the worker’s need to 
have relates to mere survival. The worker is poor in needs in the sense that he 
‘must be deprived of every need in order to be able to satisfy one need only, that, 
is the need to keep himself alive’ (Heller 1976, 58). 
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The Politics of Need 163
In the Gaus interview, Arendt refers to interests as political since, as she often 
pointed out, interests refer literally to what inter-esse or lies between individuals, 
relating them to each other (EU, 17f.).2 In contrast, Marx rejects the concept of 
interest as an alternative to need because it is irremediably embedded within 
capitalist social relations. Private interest expresses the reduction of needs to greed, 
which already amounts to the alienation of human need. The notion of a general 
interest is doubly alienating since it represents the interest of society as potentially 
in conflict with the egoistic interests of the individual. Despite Engels’ use of 
the concept, Marx sees class interest as incapable of animating a radical politics 
because it is embedded in the structure of social relations it seeks to transcend. For 
example, the struggle for wages is one predicated on class interest, which remains 
within the social division of need that capitalism establishes.
In contrast, Marx turns to the notion of radical need to articulate a principle 
that is irreducible to interests yet has the potential to transcend capitalist social 
relations (Heller 1976, 65). Radical needs refer to those needs that capitalism 
produces but is unable to satisfy. Exemplary among such needs is the need for 
free time. Due to the imperative to increase profits, capitalism reaches a point at 
which it is unable to shorten labor time any further so that the need for free time 
can only be satisfied by transcending capitalism. Capitalism thus creates the need 
for free time, while the need for free time mobilizes the working class to transcend 
capitalism (Heller 1976, 91). In contrast to the wages struggle, the struggle for 
free time aims to overcome the wages system as a whole. The need for free time 
is elemental because ‘it always thrusts beyond the limits of alienation’ and so 
potentially leads to a consciousness of alienation (Heller 1976, 91).
Against Arendt’s characterization of Marx as an economic determinist, Agnes 
Heller thus develops a reading of Marx according to which the possibility of social 
transformation is not predicated on historical necessity but is immanent within 
capitalist social relations in the form of expectations arising from radical need. 
Radical needs bring to consciousness the antinomy between the social wealth 
of the species that capitalism produces and the impoverishment of individuals. 
While capitalism produces radical needs among the masses, it cannot provide the 
means for their satisfaction. At the maximum point of capitalist alienation this 
contradiction reaches a point at which capitalist social relations can no longer 
accommodate it. At this point radical needs emerge, which express a consciousness 
of the alienation that capitalist society produces.
The importance of Heller’s interpretation of Marx for our purpose is that it 
emphasizes the relation between the experience of unmet need and the agency 
of the collective subject in bringing about radical social transformation. In 
2 In contrast to the needs of the body, Arendt thinks interests are inherently related to 
the world both as the material artifice produced through work and the web of social relations 
constituted through praxis. In contrast to needs, which are identical between individuals yet 
unshareable (HC, 119), interests are discovered and constituted through the exchange of 
opinions and, as such, presuppose both plurality and equality.
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rejecting the inherent connection between need and necessity on which Arendt’s 
ontological argument is premised, Heller’s work suggests a basis for articulating 
an authentically political politics of needs grounded in the ‘truly relating activity’ 
of praxis. On this account, the working class is the revolutionary class because it 
has no goals of its own. It is ‘a class in civil society that is not of civil society’ and 
claims ‘no particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified wrong is 
perpetrated on it’ (Marx cited in Heller 1976, 89). The working class is characterized 
by its experience of the contradiction between its ‘reduction to paltry particular 
needs’ on the one hand and the ‘rise of radical needs’ on the other hand (Heller 
1976, 89). Contrary to Arendt’s characterization of the poor/people in the French 
Revolution, revolutionary class consciousness does not amount to consciousness 
of biological needs that demand satisfaction. Rather radical needs articulate the 
simple consciousness of alienation and the need to overcome it (Heller 1976, 95).
Policing and Politicizing Need
As with her characterization of sovereignty, love and truth as anti-political, Arendt 
discerns a certain imperative in need that makes it antithetical to political freedom. 
The obdurate nature of needs means that they are unable to be altered by political 
debate and so do not afford the free exchange of opinion among equals according 
to which a world might be disclosed between them. But Arendt’s equation of need 
with natural necessity depoliticizes human needs by definitional fiat. For it is 
precisely to the extent that human needs are a product of political organization that 
they have a contingent aspect.3 Arendt’s reductive ontological argument obscures 
this. To recognize the historical aspect of needs, in contrast, is to see that, far from 
being necessary, needs might be constituted otherwise. To recognize human needs 
as contingent is to recognize the potential for a properly political politics of need. 
For, to be able to look on what is given in the light of how it might otherwise be, is 
the fundamental condition for politics and politicization with its world-disclosing 
potential.
What remains, then, in Arendt’s distinction between political freedom and social 
need that is worth retrieving? James Clarke (1993) argues persuasively that although 
Arendt’s ontological argument about needs is untenable, we should retain Arendt’s 
insight that the question of the political is in a certain sense always prior to questions of 
social justice. Although the effects of oppression are always personally experienced, 
3 Phillip Hansen (1993, 43) points out that Arendt recognizes a crucial connection 
between the economic and the political when she notes that ‘only within the framework of 
political organization, where men not merely live, but act, together, can specialization of 
work and division of labor take place’ (HC, 123). Despite this acknowledgement that the 
organization of the labor process in modern conditions is politically determined, however, 
she fails to see the potential scope for freedom within the realm of necessity which Marx 
hoped for.
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oppression ‘only becomes political when others recognize it as a shared reality, and 
further, when it can become the basis for solidarity and action’ (Clarke 1993, 342). 
In other words, demands for satisfaction of need only become political when they 
carry with them the world-disclosing potential that for Arendt is the defining feature 
of praxis. As Clarke puts it, while the social world in which women’s developmental 
needs are not met was always sexist, the ‘we’ that recognizes this social world as 
such has not always existed. ‘Thus relations that retrospectively appear “always 
already” political are, for Arendt, “not yet” political. They “become” political when 
mediated through public interaction’ (Clarke 1993, 342).
To develop this Arendtian insight about the possibility of a political politics of 
need, we might turn to another of Arendt’s critics, Jacques Rancière. In On Revolution, 
Arendt agrees with John Adams that the fundamental political wrong of poverty is 
not that basic needs are not met but that the poor are excluded from the public realm 
so that their lives remain in darkness (OR, 69). In this context, she also observes 
sympathetically that ‘Marx’s effort to rewrite history in terms of class struggle was 
partially at least inspired by the desire to rehabilitate posthumously those to whose 
injured lives history had added the insult of oblivion’ (OR, 69). Rancière concurs 
that the fundamental political wrong consists in the invisibility of the poor. However, 
he rejects her suggestion that only someone such as Adams, who had experienced 
the joy of public life, could appreciate what it would mean to be deprived of the bios 
politikos. On the contrary, Rancière (2001, 26) argues that the politics of the poor 
have invariably concerned ‘precisely their mode of visibility’.
Rancière argues that Arendt’s deafness to the political claims of the poor 
results directly from her distinction between the social and the political as 
ontologically grounded in that between zoe (the needs of mere life) and bios 
(the freedom of the good life). Against Arendt, he insists that the partition 
between the social and the political does not have an ontological (and therefore 
meta-political) basis. Rather, this partition is the ‘permanent object of litigation 
constituting politics’ (Rancière 2001, 26). For Rancière, the opposition between 
the social and the political cannot be determined philosophically but rather is 
always a matter of politics. He thus rejects Arendt’s Aristotelian identification 
of the political with a fully human life achieved through praxis in contrast to 
the mere life sustained through labor. In positing a particular way of life that is 
proper to politics, he argues, Arendt remains caught within the vicious circle of 
political philosophy, which explains politics by positing a distinction between 
a ‘character who possesses a good or a specific universality, as opposed to the 
private or domestic world of needs’ (Rancière 2001, 3).
Despite his critique of Arendt’s pure concept of the political, however, 
Rancière implicitly reconstructs her distinction between the social and the 
political in terms of his distinction between police and politics. The concept 
of police refers to ‘a symbolic constitution of the social’, which involves a 
‘partition of the sensible’ (Rancière 2001, 20). By participation of the sensible, 
Rancière means a parcelling out of the terms of political discourse or distribution 
of the roles and speaking positions in terms of which one can participate in 
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public discourse. ‘The partition of the sensible is the cutting up of the world and 
of “world”; it is the nemein [division] in terms of which the nomoi [common 
laws] of the community are founded’ (Rancière 2001, 20). This cutting up of 
the world both partitions by defining the parts of the whole in terms of which 
the social order is constructed and enables participation by delineating a public. 
Importantly, the division of the distributive aspect of the social order is always 
also predicated on a division between what is visible and what is not, what is 
sayable and what is not within that order.
In contrast, the essence of politics is to disturb the police order by ‘supplementing 
it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole’ (R ncière 
2001, 21). The logic of the police is to identify the people with the population, to 
account for the people in terms of the sum of its parts. Politics, in contrast, always 
involves the subjectivization of an agent who makes a claim to participate in an 
order in which it has no part. Politics is always enacted by a subject (the demos) 
whose only qualification to rule is its ‘freedom’ (in contrast to the qualifications 
of wealth of oligarchs or the wisdom of aristoi). As Rancière points out, before 
the demos was understood to refer to the whole community, it was a name given 
to one part, the poor. ‘The “poor”, however, does not designate an economically 
disadvantaged part of the population; it simply designates the category of peoples 
who do not count’ (Rancière 2001, 12). What Rancière wants to resist is the 
reduction of the category of the people either to a part of the population (the needy 
poor) or to the general interest of the population as a whole. Rather, the ‘people’ is 
the supplement that inscribes the ‘the count of the unaccounted-for’ or the ‘part of 
those who have no part’ within a police order (Rancière 2001, 14). This part that 
has no part is, for Rancière the proper subject of politics.
In Arendt’s terms, Rancière’s subject of politics is disclosed through collective 
action. However, the condition for the possibility of world disclosure is not the 
presence of a community of equals. Rather, it is the torsion between the social 
order that institutes the partition between rulers and ruled and the presupposition 
of a fundamental equality on which every social order rests. Every social order is 
inherently hierarchical since it concerns the distribution of the benefits and burdens 
of social co-operation according to each member’s assigned place within that 
order. Yet the division between rulers and ruled that every social order institutes 
requires that the ruled are capable of understanding the rules and in this way takes 
for granted a fundamental ontological equality manifested in the ability of ruled to 
‘understand’ their place in society.
The concept of police thus refers to an anti-political politics that disciplines 
social conflict in terms commensurate with the social order. Politics in contrast, 
is that which disrupts the rationality of police by revealing the contingency of the 
distinction that founds that order in the first place (the division between rulers and 
ruled). It follows that needs might either be policed or politicized. Indeed, Fraser 
describes the way needs might be policed in terms either of expert discourses 
(which interpret needs in terms of the management of satisfying needs that are 
taken to be self evident) or reactive discourses (which deny the legitimacy of 
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needs as the proper object of politics by seeking to re-privatize them). In contrast, 
Fraser describes a politics of needs in terms of oppositional discourses which 
seek to transform the existing terms of discourse through which needs come to be 
recognized (Fraser 1989, 303f.).
This brings us finally to the way in which Rancière thematizes the potentially 
world-disclosive aspect of a politics of need. The ‘principle function of politics’, 
Rancière insists, is to ‘disclose the world of its subjects and operations. The 
essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds 
in one’ (Rancière 2001, 22). Rancière’s understanding of politics here crucially 
still entails the world-disclosing aspect, which is the defining feature of Arendt’s 
conception of the political. However, the conditions of possibility for this world-
disclosure differ from Arendt in at least two important respects.
Firstly, the possibility of world disclosure does not depend on the presence of 
a community of equals. On the contrary, it depends on the appearance of a subject 
that has no part in the police order, who is defined by its lack of a part within 
that order. We are reminded here of the proletariat as a ‘class in civil society 
that is not of civil society’ (Heller 1976, 89). The condition of possibility of the 
appearance of this subject is its demonstration of the wrong of the police order 
(social invisibility), which depends upon occupying the position of speaking 
subject and making visible what was previously invisible. On this account, the 
presence of a community of equals is not so much the condition of possibility 
for action but rather a presupposition that enables the demonstration of the 
wrong. In other words, equality is what is disclosed rather than a precondition 
for disclosure.
Secondly, while for both Arendt and Rancière politics is agonistic, Rancière 
thematizes the struggle that leads to the event of world disclosure very differently 
from Arendt (Deranty and Renault 2009). In reviving the Greek understanding of 
the agon, Arendt views the struggle of political life to be fundamentally a struggle 
for excellence among equals. For Rancière (2001, 25, 21), in contrast, this struggle 
always entails a ‘clash between two partitions of the sensible’ and, as such, is 
first and foremost an ‘intervention on the visible and the sayable’. Returning to 
Aristotle, Rancière agrees that humans are political by virtue of their possession 
of the capacity for speech, according to which they can distinguish the just from 
the unjust. Arendt similarly makes the Aristotelian point that if politics existed for 
nothing higher than the collective satisfaction of common needs, then we would 
have no need for speech since animal sounds would be sufficient to ‘communicate 
immediate identical needs’ (HC, 176).
The problem, however, as Rancière (2001, 23) goes on to note is ‘how one 
can be sure that the human animal mouthing a noise in front of you is actually 
voicing an utterance rather than merely expressing a state of being?’ Rancière’s 
point here is fundamental. Namely, that how the political is distinguished from 
the non-political is always a political question. Domination is often exercised by 
refusing the title of political subject to a category of persons by asserting that they 
belong to a private space from which only ‘groans or cries expressing suffering, 
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hunger or anger could emerge, but not actual speeches demonstrating a shared 
aesthesis’ (Rancière 2001, 23).
Politicization has always involved members of such groups making themselves 
heard as speaking subjects by ‘demonstrating to be a shared feeling or shared 
“good” or “evil” what had appeared merely as an expression of pleasure or pain’ 
(Rancière 2001, 23). World-disclosure comes about through the manifestation of 
dissensus, the demonstration of the wrong of a social order by lodging one world 
in another (see Deranty 2003). For example, by lodging the ‘political’ world in 
which the radical need for free time would be satisfied in the ‘social’ world in 
which the human needs of workers are reduced to the basic need for survival.
Following Rancière, a politics of need would be one in which the needs of a 
socially subordinated group of people would be articulated in a way that makes 
visible what was previously invisible within the social order. A properly political 
argument about need would at the same time be:
…the demonstration of a possible world where the argument [that a need ought to 
be satisfied] could count as argument, addressed by a subject [in need] qualified 
to argue, upon an identified [need], to an addressee who is required to see the 
[need] and to hear the argument [for its satisfaction] that he or she ‘normally’ has 
no reason to either see or hear. (Rancière 2001, 24)
In terms of the five aspects of Arendt’s conception of the political, such a politics 
would be initiatory in that the articulation of needs would at the same bring 
about a new sensibility within the public realm. It would be constitutive in that 
it would reconfigure the context in terms of which social conflict would be 
represented. It would be inclusive in that the demonstration of the wrong of the 
existing social order would at the same time amount to the demonstration of the 
equality of those subordinated within that order with their social superiors. It 
would be performative in that the articulation of a need through praxis would at 
the same time entail the self-constitution of a collective agent claiming the right 
to its satisfaction on behalf of all. It would be disclosive since the articulation of 
the need would reveal the commonness of the world between the parties to the 
conflict over the existence, interpretation and satisfaction of needs.
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